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Learning with minimal information in continuous games

Editor Economía
  • Presentador: Mario Bravo
  • Proveniente: Usach Dpto. Matemáticas
  • Fecha: 27-03-2019
  • Hora: 12 horas
  • Lugar: Sala R3, Edificio Recicla

Resumen

In this talk we introduce a learning process for games with continuous action sets. The procedure is payoff-based and thus requires no sophistication from players and no knowledge of the game. We show that despite such limited information, players will converge to Nash in large classes of games (possibly with a continuum of equilibria). In particular, convergence to stable Nash equilibrium is guaranteed in all games with strategic complements as well as in concave games. Time permitting, we will also discuss convergence results for locally ordinal potential games and games with isolated equilibria.

Independent Thinking and Hard Working, or Caring and Well Behaved? Short- and Long-Term Impacts of Gender Identity Norms

Editor Economía
  • Presentador: Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano
  • Proveniente: Universidad de Alicante
  • Fecha: 10-04-2019
  • Hora: 12 horas
  • Lugar: Sala R3, Edificio Recicla

  Resumen 

Using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health, we explore the causal effect of gender-identity norms on female teenagers' engagement in risky behaviors relative to males in the US. To do so, we exploit idiosyncratic variation across adjacent grades within schools in the proportion of high-school peers' mothers who think that important skills for both boys and girls to possess are traditionally masculine ones, such as to think for him or herself or work hard, as opposed to traditionally feminine ones, namely to be well-behaved, popular or help others. We find that a higher proportion of mothers who believe that independent thinking and working hard matter for either gender reduces the gender gap in risky behaviors, traditionally more prevalent among males, both in the short and medium run. We also find evidence of convergence in the labor market in early adulthood. Short- and medium-run results are driven by a reduction in males' engagement in risky behaviors; long-run results are driven by females' higher annual earnings and lower welfare dependency.

 

Para mayor información sobre Ana Sanz de Galdeano, acceda aquí.

Game Show Economics

Editor Economía
  • Presentador: Dennie van Dolder
  • Proveniente: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
  • Fecha: 16-01-2019
  • Hora: 12 horas
  • Lugar: Sala R3, Edificio Recicla

Resumen 

Much of what we know about individual decision making to date derives from laboratory experiments, and less so from real-life settings. Real-world data typically entail a lack of control, which can make it difficult to discriminate between competing hypotheses. Carefully designed experiments do allow for this and have generated a rich literature, but are at the same time vulnerable to criticism about the generalizability of findings to situations beyond the context of the lab. Because it is impossible to study behavior under each and every possible set of conditions, the optimal approach is to study behavior in a limited number of diverging ways. The use of TV game shows is one of these. Game shows allow the study of behavior in a high-scrutiny field setting where the stakes are high, and for a diverse subject pool. Combined with the strict and well-defined rules, game shows can provide unique opportunities to investigate the robustness of existing laboratory findings. In our talk, we will present our game show work on risk taking, bargaining, and cooperation.

Signalling in the Presence of Tests

Editor Economía
  • Presentador: Carla Guadalupi
  • Proveniente: Universidad del Desarrollo
  • Fecha: 13-03-2019
  • Hora: 12 horas
  • Lugar: Sala R3, Edificio Recicla

Resumen

We consider a signaling model in which firms not only observe the worker's costly signal, but may also acquire information. The worker's productivity depends on his type (innate skills) as well as his quality (the match between the worker and the firm). A good-type worker is more likely to be a better fit for a firm, but it will not be necessarily so. While the worker's quality is initially unknown to both the worker and the firm, the type is private information, and can be communicated through the choice of a costly action, e.g. the education level. The firm might complement this information by performing a test to learn the match between the worker and the firm. We model the firm's information acquisition problem using the rational inattention approach. That is, we allow the firm to choose any information structure with no restriction on a particular signal distribution, and with a cost proportional to the entropy between prior and posterior beliefs. In equilibrium, the firm will prefer more informative signals when beliefs are intermediate. More importantly, beliefs are determined by the costly action chosen by the worker through signaling. We characterize the set of Perfect Bayesian Equillibria that satisfy the divinity criterion (D1). We show that workers fully disclose their type up to intermediate beliefs about quality. In particular, the LCSE is the only equilibrium when the expected match between the firm and the worker is low, even for the good-type. In that case, most of the information acquisition is left to the firm. Tests will be more sofisticated when beliefs about the worker-firm match are pessimistic. Thus bad-type workers will be dissuaded from mimicking good-type education level in order to avoid a more precise test. The opposite happens when the expected fit is high even for the bad type. When beliefs are sufficiently optimistic, firms relax their standards. This is more beneficial for the bad-type worker who prefers to shroud information and pool with the good-type worker. Pooling is then the only equilibrium. Finally, when bad-type workers have low expected fit, and good-type ones have high expected fit, the equilibrium is semipooling. The good type partially signals its type, while the bad-type worker randomizing between no education and signaling.

 

 

Impact of size on the transmission of bank risk during the Subprime crisis in the US banking sector

Editor Economía
  • Presentador: Gabriel Pino Saldías
  • Proveniente: Universidad de Talca
  • Fecha: 12-12-2018
  • Hora: 12 horas
  • Lugar: Sala R3, Edificio Recicla

Resumen 

This paper investigates bank size as a factor of the transmission of risk in the US banking sector during the Subprime crisis. Specifically, the transmission of risk is investigated in two directions; from large to small banks and from small to large banks. For this purpose, a Spatial Autoregressive model is estimated by using all US commercial banks from 2005 to 2010. Results show that while the transmission from small to large banks appears during early stages of the Subprime crisis, this transmission despairs post the pick effects of this crisis. However, the transmission from large to small banks appear latter but is long lasting being significant during the last period of the sample studied here, i.e. 2010.

 

  1. Labor market inclusion in rural-urban territories in Chile
  2. The Impact of Penalties for Wrong Answers on the Gender Gap in Test Scores
  3. Does Bias in Reporting Imply Bias in Behavior?
  4. Tax Audits as Scarecrows

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