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Optimal government regulations and red tape in an economy with corruption
Información adicional
Autor:
Mendez, F. and Sepúlveda, F.
Revista:
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics
Vol. 54, Issue 1, Pp.: 51-77
Fecha Publicación:
2013
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